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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION
 
In his seminal work ‘Future Shock’, American futurist Alvin Toffler made an important observation: 
  
“Change is not merely necessary to life, it is life.” 1   
  
Used in a different context by the futuristic Author, this quote serves to highlight that life is all about variation and 
that the changes we are faced with, especially in law, are not necessary for our lives; but are part of our lives. 
Change develops the shortcoming in law; hence it advances us to keep pace with the times.  
 
An important change to the definition of section (s) 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995, one 
of the categories of an automatically unfair dismissal, has been effected by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 
of 2014. Section 187(1)(c) has been amended  from where the reason for the dismissal of an employee was “ to 
compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and 
employee” to where the reason for the dismissal of an employee is “a refusal by employees to accept a demand in 
respect of any matter of mutual interest between them and their employer.”2  
 
The aforementioned change is aimed at correcting the interpretation of the initial version of s 187(1)(c) by the 
courts (which were to preclude the dismissal of employees where the reason for the dismissal is their refusal to 
accept a demand by the employer over a matter of mutual interest).3 It further appears to protect the integrity of the 
process of collective bargaining, in that employers in a collective relationship context will no longer be able to 
force a change in terms and conditions of employment without the express agreement of the employees.  
 
Collective bargaining is regarded as the process whereby employers and organised groups of employees seek to 
reconcile conflicting goals through mutual accommodation.4 In Metal & Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd,5 it was 
held that to bargain means to haggle and wrangle so as to arrive at some agreement on terms of give and take, 
whereas to consult does not imply any kind of agreement. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
categorically states that every trade union, employer’s organisation and the employer has the right to engage in 
collective bargaining.6               
  
In terms of s 188(1)(a)(ii) of the LRA, the employer may dismiss an employee for a fair reason based on its 
operational requirements.7 The question that arises is, when it can be said that in dismissing employees, the 
employer is exercising his right to dismiss for operational requirements as opposed to where the reason for the 
                                                     
1 See Quotation at www.alvintoffler.net/?fa=galleryquotes (last accessed 15 February 2016) 
2 Section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act and the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014 
3 Grogan J Workplace Law 11 ed (2014) 214 
4 Grogan J Workplace Law 10 ed (2009) 343 
5 (1985) 6 ILJ 478 (IC) at 493 H-J 
6 Section 23(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
7 Section 188(1)(a)(ii) of the LRA 66 of 1995 
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dismissal of an employee is “a refusal by employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest 
between them and their employer which is contrary to the provisions of s 187(1)(c)? The aforementioned sections 
appear difficult to settle with each other,8 or so I thought. 
 
Matters of mutual interest are said to include matters such as the terms and conditions of employment, wages, 
overtime and leave.9 Before, where the employer, for example, negotiates with the employees for a proposed shift 
change contrary to the terms and conditions of their employment contract and they refuse to accept the change, the 
employer may dismiss them for a fair reason based on its operational requirements.10 The proviso was that the 
dismissal does not violate the prohibition in s 187(1)(c) of the LRA, namely “to compel the employee to accept a 
demand of mutual interest”. In National Union of Metalworkers of SA (NUMSA) & others v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd 
(Fry’s Metals),11 it was stated that a dismissal that is final and not conditional on acceptance of the demand can 
never be regarded as a reason “to compel the employee to accept” that demand and is therefore not in violation of s 
187(1)(c). 
  
When the employer proposes a change to the terms and conditions of employment which is refused by the 
employees, such a refusal gives rise to a dispute of interest between the employer and the employees. According to 
Rycroft and Jordaan, disputes of interest concern the creation of fresh rights which must be resolved through 
collective bargaining, mediation and as a last resort through peaceful industrial action.12   
 
Thompson indicates that although an operational requirement dismissal falls outside the arena of collective 
bargaining, since it is regarded as a rights issue, a debate over the operational requirements of the business is 
essentially an interest issue and not a legal one, which must begin in the bargaining arena.13 Since dismissal is not a 
permissible form of leverage in the bargaining process, the courts will have to determine when the dispute had 
permissibly migrated from a bargaining domain (where matters of mutual interest cannot legitimately trigger 
dismissals) to a legal/right domain (where the employer is permitted to dismiss for operational reasons).14 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal has held that the “migration of issues” does not form the basis of our statutory structure 
and, therefore, s 187(1)(c) cannot be interpreted as if the legislation proceeds from that premise.15  
 
Under the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014, s 187(1)(c) provides that “a dismissal is automatically 
unfair if the reason for the dismissal is a refusal  by employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest between them and their employer.” The question that  needs to be answered now is whether it 
would still be permissible for the employer to invoke operational requirements to dismiss employees without being 
in conflict with the prohibition in s 187(1)(c), where the employer had proposed a shift change as an alternative to 
retrenchment and it was refused by the employees? Furthermore, will it be possible at all to dismiss employees for 
operational requirements upon the refusal of a mutual interest demand, whether the dismissal is final or not?  
                                                     
8 Thompson C ‘Bargaining Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal’ (1999) 20 ILJ 755 
9 Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work 3nd (2015) 258 
10 See section 188(1)(a)(ii) of the LRA 66 of 1995  
11 (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA) at 708 F 
12 Rycroft & Jordaan A Guide to SA Labour Law (Juta 1992) 169 
13 Thompson C ‘Bargaining Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal’ (1999) 20 ILJ 760 
14 Thompson C ‘Bargaining Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal’ (1999) 20 ILJ 760 
15 NUMSA and others v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA) at 707 H-I 
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The problem this research seeks to address is, whether the effect and purpose of the amendment of s 187(1)(c) are 
 to abolish the principles as set out in Fry’s Metals and to determine whether the court had correctly interpreted the 
intention of the legislator. The purpose is to establish if the employer will now be precluded from dismissing 
employees for operational reasons, even if the real reason for the dismissal is not the refusal to accept a mutual 
interest demand but objective criteria which causes an immediate threat to the survival of the business and which 
justifies dismissal. 
 
It is submitted that the amendment significantly widens the scope of s 187(1)(c) in that it presents new challenges 
to the employer in differentiating between automatically unfair dismissals for refusing to accept the changed terms 
and conditions of employment and a legitimate dismissal based on the grounds of the employer’s operational 
requirements. The significance of the study is to bring clarity to the question of when will it be fair for an 
employer, in the course of restructuring his business, to dismiss any of his employees who refuse to accept the 
proposed changes to the terms and conditions of their employment. 
 
The LRA 66 of 1995 permits employers to dismiss employees for ‘operational requirements’.16 Section 213 of the 
LRA defines “operational requirements” to mean: requirements based on the economic, technological, structural or 
similar needs of the employer.17 There are many considerations that might induce employers to dismiss employees 
for operational reasons. Considerations such as a drop in demand for products or services; the introduction of new 
technology; reorganisation and the introduction of more productive and cost efficient work methods are but some 
considerations which might tempt employers to resort to a retrenchment exercise.18 
 
Section 189 of the LRA sets out the employers’ obligation to consult against the right to dismiss employees on the 
basis of the employers’ operational requirements, including that an employer who contemplates dismissing 
employees based on operational requirements is required to consult the person(s) whose dismissal is 
contemplated.19 The consultation process envisaged in s 189(1) must be “a meaningful joint consensus-seeking 
process” in that it must attempt to reach consensus on several items which includes measures to avoid dismissals; 
minimising the number of dismissals; changing the timing of the dismissal; and the mitigation of the adverse 
effects of the dismissal.20 The consultation process must include discussions on the method for selection of the 
employees to be dismissed and the severance pay of those employees to be dismissed.21 
 
Furthermore, the consultation process is initiated by s 189(3), which requires the employer to issue a written notice 
inviting the person(s) whose dismissal is contemplated to the consultation.22 The employer must make a full and 
adequate disclosure on relevant information which must include the reasons for the proposed dismissals; the 
alternatives considered before the proposal to dismiss; the reasons for rejecting each of the alternatives; the number 
of the employees likely to be effected and their job categories of employment; the proposed method for selecting 
                                                     
16 Section 189 and 189A of the LRA 66 of 1995 
17 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
18 Grogan J 11 ed (2014) 318 
19 See Aunde South Africa (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (2011) 32 ILJ 2617 at 2625 E-H 
20 Section 189(2)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995  
21 Section 189(2)(b)-(c) of the LRA 66 of 1995 
22 Section 189(3) of the LRA; See also Van Niekerk et al (2015) 322 
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the employees to be dismissed; the severance pay that is proposed; the assistance proposed by the employer to the 
employees likely to be  dismissed; the possibility of future re-employment of the dismissed employees; the number 
of employees the employer employs; and the number of employees dismissed for reasons based on operational 
requirements in the preceding twelve months.23 
 
The employee(s) to be dismissed must be selected according to criteria that have been agreed to by the parties. 
Where no criteria have been agreed, the criteria that are “fair and objective” must be agreed upon.24 The employer 
must allow the person whose dismissal is contemplated an opportunity to make representations about the subject 
matter of the consultation.25 He must further consider and respond to representations and where denied, reasons 
must be provided therefor.26 
 
Furthermore, the Act distinguishes between large and small scale dismissals based on operational requirements.27 
Whereas a small scale retrenchment is regulated by s 189 and refers to retrenchments by employers employing less 
than 50 employees, large-scale retrenchments are regulated by s 189A.28 Section 189A makes provision for 
facilitation to assist the parties engaged in consultation and imposes minimum time periods for the consultation to 
take effect.29 In addition, s 189A provides for the employee to participate in a strike and for the employer to lock 
out.30 Furthermore, this section also provides for direct access to the Labour Court where the employer does not 
comply with a fair procedure, provided that the proceedings are initiated within 30 days from the date of 
dismissal.31 
 
Section 23 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 guarantees a fundamental right in respect of 
labour relations by providing that “everyone has the right to fair labour practices.” The 1995 LRA gives effect to 
the right to fair labour practices in that employees have the right not to be unfairly dismissed or subjected to unfair 
labour practices.32 In Edcon v Steenkamp and Others,33 Edcon sought a declaration that s 189A(2)(a) read with s 
189A(8) of the LRA, as interpreted in the De Beers Group Services (Pty) Ltd v Num [2011] 4 BLLR 319 (LAC) 
and Revan Civil Engineering Contractors and Others V NUM  [2012] 33 ILJ 1846 (LAC)  is unconstitutional and 
in violation with s 23. In the aforementioned cases, it was held that where the employer issues notices of 
termination before the period referred to in s 189A (8)(b) has elapsed, the ensuing dismissals are invalid and of no 
force or effect.34 The court held that the interpretation of s 189A(2)(a) read with s 189A(8) as set out in these cases 
were wrong and erroneous and that non-compliance therewith does not lead to an invalid dismissal.35  
 
                                                     
23 Section 189(3)(a)-(j) of the LRA 66 of 1995 
24 Section 189(7)(a) and ((b) of the LRA 66 of 1995 
25 Section 189(5) of the LRA 66 of 1995 
26 Section 189(6)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995 
27 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 313 
28 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 313 
29 Section 189A(2)(c) to (7) of the LRA 66 of 1995 
30 Section 189A (9)-(12) of the LRA 66 of 1995 
31 Section 189A(13)-(17) of the LRA 66 of 1995 
32 See s 185 of the LRA 66 of 1995 
33 2015 (4) SA 247 (LAC) (3 March 2015) at para 25 
34 Edcon v Steenkamp and Others 2015 (4) SA 247 (LAC) (3 March 2015) at para 24 
35 Edcon v Steenkamp and Others 2015 (4) SA 247 (LAC) (3 March 2015) at para 56 
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The right not to be unfairly dismissed and subjected to unfair labour practices is contained in s 185 of the LRA 6 of 
1995. Naturally, this means that employers resorting to dismissals in order to effect necessary changes to 
conditions of employment in the workplace may, therefore, only do so provided that the dismissals are fair and a 
fair procedure is followed.36 In cases involving unfair dismissals, the first question to be established is whether a 
‘dismissal’ had actually occurred.37 In this regard, section 186 of the LRA 66 of 1995 sets out the varying forms of 
dismissal, including that an employer has terminated the employment relationship with or without notice. 
 
An employee claiming to have been dismissed under this s 186(1)(a) would usually have a contract of employment 
with his employer which was terminated at the instance of his employer.38 However, the term ‘contract of 
employment’ has been deleted from the original version of s 186(1)(a). Therefore, the existence of a valid contract 
of employment is no longer a requirement for this dismissal.39 The only requirement is that an employment 
relationship must have existed which was terminated at the instance of the employer.40 A decision by an employee 
to resign or a consensual termination between the employer and an employee does not constitute a dismissal at the 
instance of the employer.41  
 
1.2 LOCK-OUT DISMISSALS 
 
In terms of s 1 of the 1956 LRA, a contract of employment could be terminated at the instance of the employer to 
induce or compel any person under his employment to agree with any demands concerning terms and conditions of 
employment.42 Employers could, therefore, within the context of a lock-out dismissal dismiss their employees who 
refuse to accept proposed changes to their conditions of service, for example, a proposed shift change or a cut in 
salary, pending an acceptance of the proposed changes by the employees at a later stage.43 The purpose of this form 
of dismissal, which was allowed within the context of a lock-out dismissal, was to induce or compel an employee 
to comply with the employer’s demands.44 It was conditional in that it was coupled with an offer of re-employment 
which implied that as soon as the employees accept the employer’s proposals they would be reinstated. 
   
The LRA 66 of 1995 then introduced a lock-out which allowed employers only to physically exclude their 
employees from the workplace, but not to dismiss them, for the purpose of compelling their employees to accept a 
demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between them.45 A lock-out under s 213 of the LRA 66 of 1995 
reads as follows:  
 
“Lock-out’ means the exclusion by an employer of employees from the employer’s workplace, for the purpose of 
compelling the employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and 
                                                     
36 Grogan J (2014) 189 
37 Grogan J (2014) 164 
38 Grogan J (2014) 165 
39 See Member of Executive Council, Department of Health v Odendal and others (2009) 30 ILJ 2093 (LC) at 2112 H-I  
40 Grogan J (2014) 166 
41 Grogan J (2014) 168 
42 See Grogan J (2014) 486  
43 Van Niekerk et al (2012) 248 
44 Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work (2012) 423 
45 See s 213 of the LRA 66 of 1995 
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employee, whether or not the employer breaches those employees’ contracts of employment in the course of or for 
the purpose of that exclusion.’ 
 
In Schoeman v Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd,46 the court held as follows: 
 
“An employer in the private sector needs to be able to survive and prosper economically. To do this, the employer 
must meet changed market circumstances and be competitive. To meet the changes of the market, adaptations are 
required. An employer needs the flexibility to deploy, reasonably quickly and efficiently, the resources at the 
employer’s disposal. Various options are open to an employer to achieve this. One of them is the lock-out route 
which is used to compel acceptance of a demand…An employer may not dismiss an employee in order to compel 
acceptance of a demand.”  
 
Therefore, if the employees simply refuse to accept a proposed change in their conditions of service without being 
compelled thereto by the employer, there is nothing to preclude the employer from dismissing the employees for a 
reason related to its operational requirements.47  
 
1.3 LABOUR RELATIONS AMENDMENT ACT 6 OF 2014 
 
It is submitted that on the literal interpretation of s 187(1)(c), the aforementioned section signifies that dismissals 
will be automatically unfair even where the employees are given an alternative to dismissals, as contained in the 
consultation requirement of s 189(3), but refuse to accept the alternatives. The employer will, therefore, have to be 
careful when suggesting alternatives to dismissals, although previous court decisions have recognised changes to 
terms and conditions of employment based on operational requirements as being fair where such changes resulted 
in dismissals for refusal thereof.48  
 
Whilst s 187(1) (c) precludes employers from dismissing employees if the reason for the dismissal is the refusal of 
the employee to accept a demand in respect of a mutual interest demand between them and the employer, the 
employer may rely on s 188 (1)(a)(ii) which permits a dismissal on the grounds of operational requirements on the 
basis that he is not forcing the employees to accept a change, but rather that his operational requirements justify 
dismissal. 
 
In Fry’s Metals,49 the court drew a distinction between a dismissal based on operational requirements and a s 187 
(1)(c) dismissal. It interpreted s 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Act to protect employees from being dismissed if the purpose 
of the dismissal was to compel them to accept a demand on a matter of mutual interest and the dismissal was of a 
temporary nature, whereas an operational requirement dismissal in terms of s 188(1)(a)(ii) on the other hand is 
permanent.50 
 
                                                     
46 (1999) 20 ILJ 200 (LC) at para 18-19 
47 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 258 
48 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 152 H-J  
49 (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 147 G-H 
50 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 144 H and 146 B-C 
 
 
 
 
  7 
 
The Labour Appeal Court held that s 187(1)(c) only applies to dismissals that are subject to being withdrawn by the 
employer upon the employees’ acceptance of the employer’s demand.51 A dismissal that is final and not subject to 
being withdrawn falls outside the ambit of this section.52 According to the court, a dismissal contemplated by s 
187(1)(c) is temporary as it is subject to being withdrawn when the employees accept the employers demand.53 The 
main aim of this section is not really to dismiss the employees but instead to induce them to comply with the 
employer’s demand.54 Dismissals that are effected for operational requirements in terms of s 188(1)(a)(ii) on the 
other hand are permanent and it is intended to replace workers who are not prepared to work under the terms and 
conditions of employment demanded by the operational requirements of the business with those willing to do so.55   
 
Thompson states …”after Fry’s Metals we have a situation where a temporary dismissal to compel acceptance with 
a mutual interest demand must be branded as automatically unfair and countered with the strongest remedies 
available at law while a permanent dismissal for the same reason but without justification (in other words, not a 
dismissal defensible under ss188/189) is treated as a lesser industrial offence with lesser remedies.” 56 
  
The Fry’s Metals judgement appears to be irregular in that it produces an unhappy industrial relations outcome.57 It 
appears that employers are now obliged to take final and irrevocable action rather than limited action.58  
 
1.4 EVALUATING CONSULTATION PROCESSES IN SOUTH AFRICA TO THAT OF FOREIGN 
JURISDICTIONS 
 
In assessing the employer’s obligation to consult against the right to dismiss employees on the basis of the 
employer’s operational requirements the South African (SA) courts have held that the employer was obliged to 
consult before dismissal of its members for operational requirements.59 Section 189(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995 
requires that the consultation process commences when the employer contemplates dismissing one or more 
employees based on operational requirements and not when the decision to dismiss has already been determined. 
The issue on consultation merits further investigation, in particular, as to the stance taken in foreign jurisdictions. 
This will be addressed properly via relevant case law and legislation in chapter four. 
 
In United Kingdom (UK), for example, s 188(1) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
(TULRCA) 1992 provides that “an employer proposing to dismiss as redundant an employee a description in 
                                                     
51 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 147 H  
52 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 147 E  
53 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 147 H-I  
54 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 146 E-D  
55 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 147 I-J   
56 Thompson C ‘Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of the Spheres after Fry’s Metals’ (2006) 27 ILJ 728 
57 Thompson C ‘Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of the Spheres after Fry’s Metals’ (2006) 27 ILJ 723 
58 Thompson C ‘Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of the Spheres after Fry’s Metals’ (2006) 27 ILJ 728 
59 See Aunde South Africa (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (2011) 32 ILJ 2617 at para 27  
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respect of which an independent trade union is recognised by him shall consult representatives of the Union about 
the dismissal in accordance with this section.”  
 
The Fair Work Act 2009 (FWA) in Australia, on the other hand, makes provision for a consultation clause to be 
included in modern awards and enterprise agreements to regulate consultation processes between employers and 
employees.60 Such a consultation clause includes terms that require employees to consult with employees about 
major changes that are likely to have a significant effect on their employment.61 The parties can choose the modern 
award, the enterprise agreement or the model consultation term in the Fair Work Regulations (FWR) 2009 – 
Schedule 2.3 to be applicable to the employment situation.62 
 
Regulation 2.09 of the FWR 2009 – Schedule 2.3 states that the model consultation term applies if the employer 
has made a definite decision to introduce a major change to production, program, organisation, structure or 
technology in relation to its enterprise that is likely to have a significant effect on the employees; or proposes to 
introduce a change to the regular roster or ordinary hours of work of employees.63 
 
Furthermore, s 389(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 provides that a dismissal will be a case of genuine redundancy if 
the person’s employer no longer required the person’s job to be performed by anyone because of changes in the 
operational requirements of the employer’s enterprise; and the employer has complied with any modern award or 
enterprise agreement that applied to the employment to consult about the redundancy. In Ventyx Pty Ltd v Mr Paul 
Murray,64 the court found that the employer did communicate the redundancies in terms of the award provision for 
the purposes of s 389(1)(b) of the FWA. The court further found the employer had made the applicant’s 
employment redundant in terms of s 389 of the FWA.65 
  
In the UK  the word ‘propose’ to dismiss is used in the consultation clause of s 188 of TULCRA as opposed to 
‘contemplates’ dismissal as indicated in s 189(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995, and imposes a limitation with regard to 
the timing of the dismissal.66 When dismissals are ‘contemplated’, they are envisaged as a possibility and occur at 
an earlier point in time than when they are proposed.67 The word ‘propose’ to dismiss occurs thus at a later stage 
than the word ‘contemplates’ dismissal when there is more certainty.68 In SA the obligation to consult when 
‘dismissals are contemplated’, therefore envisages an earlier state in time than ‘proposing to dismiss’ and a 
‘definite decision to dismiss’ as in the case of the UK and Australian respectively.  
  
Secondly, the requirement of a ‘meaningful joint consensus-seeking process’ in s 189(2) of the LRA envisages that 
the consultation must be an exhaustive joint problem solving process between the employer and the consulting 
                                                     
60 See s 139(1)(j), s 145A and s 205 of the Fair Work Act 2009 
61 Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award 2010 at  21 
62 See s 139, s 205 and s 258 of the Fair Work Act 2009 
63 Fair Work Regulations 2009 – Schedule 2.3 
64 [2014] FWCFB 2143 at para 39 
65 In Ventyx Pty Ltd v Mr Paul Murray [2014] FWCFB 2143 at para 158 
66 See UK Coal Mining Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers ([2008] IRLR 4) at para 36 
67 UK Coal Mining Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers ([2008] IRLR 4) at para 37 
68 UK Coal Mining Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers ([2008] IRLR 4) at para 37 
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parties.69 This requirement goes further than consultation in the ordinary sense70 and is absent in the consultation 
processes of both UK and Australia. In Australia, the model consultation term applies when a “definite decision” is 
reached. This is particularly controversial as a ‘definite decision’ to introduce a change consisting of a termination 
of employment implies that the consultation is approached with a fixed outcome in mind.71 
In SA, the consultation procedures appear controversial only in so far as it affects small businesses, in that the same 
consultation processes are applied for all employees. In Australia, the FWA provides for some exemptions or 
specific requirements pertaining to dismissals in businesses with less than 15 employees, referred to in the Act as 
“small business employer.”72 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
Compared to SA and the UK, Australia’s law on consultation requirements appears less protective of employees 
and appears to represent a strong bias towards preserving employer prerogative in respect of the scope of 
employees who enjoy protection against unfair dismissal. This is particularly so in the light that consultation in 
Australia is required to take place when a “definite decision” is reached.73 A “definite decision” to introduce a 
change consisting of a termination of employment before consultation had taken place would imply that the 
consultation is futile.74 It appears that employees who face dismissals would therefore not be able to make any 
meaningful proposals to avoid the dismissals. Such a consultation places employees, whose dismissals are 
contemplated, at a disadvantage as it might be too late for them to make any meaningful proposals to avoid 
dismissals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
69 National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa & others v Comark Holdings (Pty) Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ 516 (LC) at 524 D 
70 See Grogan J (2014) 323 
71 See UK Coal Mining Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers ([2008] IRLR 4) at para 86 
72 Section 23 of the FWA 
73 Section 389(1) of the FWA 2009 
74 See UK Coal Mining Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers ([2008] IRLR 4) at para 86  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Dismissals based on the operational requirements of the employer’s business are categorised as “no fault” 
dismissals.75 The reason for this is that the termination of employment is linked to the employer’s constraints and 
needs rather than any act or omission on the part of the employee.76 Therefore the law is more prescriptive, in 
terms of substance and procedure than in the case of a dismissal for misconduct or incapacity.77 The Act and, in 
particular, the relevant Code of Good Practice also have placed particular obligations on the employer towards 
ensuring that employees to be dismissed for operational requirements are treated fairly.  
 
The court, in General Food Industries Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union,78 summarized the position as follows:  
 
“The loss of jobs through retrenchment has such a deleterious impact on the life of workers and their families that it 
is imperative that – even though reasons to retrench employees may exist - they will only be accepted as valid if the 
employer can show that all viable steps have been considered and taken to prevent the retrenchments or to limit 
these to a minimum.” 
 
2.2 JUSTIFICATION 
 
Section 188 of the LRA provides that “(1) a dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails 
to prove – 
 
(a) that the reason for a dismissal is a fair reason - 
(i) related to the employee’s conduct or capacity; or 
(ii) based on the employer’s operational requirements and  
(b) that the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure.” 
 
Section 188 of the LRA thus recognises dismissals for operational requirements as an acceptable norm provided 
that the statutory requirements for an employer to justify dismissal in terms of s 188(1)(a)(ii) namely to prove that 
the reason for a dismissal was a fair reason and that it was procedurally fair in terms of s 188(1)(b) are complied 
with. Non-compliance with the latter sections will result in the dismissal to be substantively and procedurally 
unfair. For operational requirements dismissals, however, to be substantively and procedurally fair, an employer 
will also have to comply with the procedures as laid down in s 189 of the LRA and the Code of Good Practice on 
Dismissals based on Operational Requirements (the Code).79  
 
 
 
                                                     
75 Schedule 2 of the Code of Good Practice on Dismissal based on Operational Requirements 
76 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 313 
77 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 313 
78 [2004] 7 BLLR 667 (LAC) at para 55  
79 See GN 1517 in GG 20254, dated 16 July 1999 
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2.3 THE MEANING OF ‘OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS’ 
 
Part II of the International Law Convention (ILO) 158 deals with the termination of employment for economic, 
structural or similar reasons. Part II states the following: ‘Technological reasons’ refers to the introduction of new 
machinery or technological innovations that affect working relationships by rendering jobs redundant or by 
requiring employees to adapt working conditions to new technologies, even where this may necessitate a change in 
their terms and conditions of employment. ‘Structural reasons’ include circumstances in which an enterprise 
transforms itself into new working groups or combines with others. ‘Economic reasons’ relate to the financial 
security of an enterprise and include factors which impact on the business profitability such as the state of the 
market and the economy or a drop in demand for services. This instrument was followed as a guideline by our 
courts under the 1956 Act and is now incorporated into s 213 of the LRA.80 
 
As indicated above, s 213 of the LRA defines “operational requirements” to mean: requirements based on the 
economic, technological, structural or similar needs of the employer.81 This definition is according to a wide 
variety of writers of labour law and case law an expansive definition. It is said to be reconcilable with the approach 
taken by labour courts that retrenchment is acceptable whether aimed at stemming losses or increasing profits.82 
According to Darcy Du Toit, the definition is ‘broad enough to include every conceivable business consideration 
that might lead an employer to consider dismissal in the context of restructuring’.83 Van Niekerk argues that the 
expansive definition of operational requirements has permitted the courts over the years to include in this category 
dismissals for incompatibility and a refusal to accept changed conditions of employment consequent upon the need 
to reorganise work as well as dismissals at the behest of a third party.84 Furthermore, the courts have held that all 
that is required is a bona fide economic rationale – in other words, the retrenchment must be aimed at effecting 
savings.85  
   
 The Code notes that it is difficult to define all the circumstances that might legitimately form the basis of a 
dismissal in these circumstances.86 The Code further suggests that economic reasons are those that relate to the 
financial management of the enterprise, technological reasons refer to new technology that affects work 
relationships, and structural reasons relate to the redundancy of posts consequent to and on the restructuring of the 
employers enterprise. In Morapane v Gilbeys Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Ltd & Another,87 the Labour Court stated 
that the codes provide guidelines but do not give rise to rights. 
 
I will now attempt to analyse the provisions of the Code as well as the courts’ interpretation of the components of 
the definition of ‘operational requirements’. 
 
 
                                                     
80 Grogan J Dismissal 1 ed (2010) 340 
81 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
82 Food and Allied Workers Union & others v SA Breweries Ltd (2004) 25 ILJ 1979(LC) at 1980 E-F 
83 Du Toit ‘Business Restructuring and Operational Requirements Dismissals: Algorax and Beyond’ (2005) 26 ILJ 602 
84 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 314 
85 De Vries  & andere v Lanzerac Hotel & andere (1993) 14 ILJ 432 (IC) at 435-6 
86 GN 1517 in GG 20254, dated 16 July 1999 
87 (1998) 19 ILJ 635 (LC) at 640 E & H 
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2.4 Economic needs 
 
As indicated above, the Code suggests ‘economic reasons to be those that relate to the financial management of the 
enterprise’. This interpretation of economic needs is very wide and suggests that dismissals based on operational 
will include those economic reasons relating to the financial management of the enterprise.88 Neither the Act nor 
the Code gives guidance as to what economic reasons will constitute an economic need. In Chemical Workers 
Industrial Union & others V Algorax (Pty) Ltd (Algorax),89 the respondent was unhappy about the costs at which it 
was conducting its business and introduced a shift system to bring the costs down. The court held that it should 
intervene where it is clear that certain measures could be been taken to avoid job losses or where it is clear that the 
dismissals were not a measure of last resort.90 An employer may therefore only resort to dismissing employees for 
operational requirements as a measure of last resort.  
 
However, in Fry’s Metals,91 the court in dealing with the proposition that an employer may not dismiss for 
operational reasons to increase profits in order to ensure the survival of the business, held the following: ‘[That] 
argument has no statutory basis in our law. This is so because all that the Act refers to, and recognises, in this 
regard is an employer’s right to dismiss for a reason based on its operational requirements without making any 
distinction between operational requirements in the context of a business the survival of which is under threat and a 
business which is making profit and wants to make more profit.’ 
 
It the case of Mazista Tiles v NUM,92 the Labour Appeal Court deliberated that even though Mazista Tiles had 
indeed continued to make profits this had not precluded the company from retrenching the employees. This is so 
because employers are entitled to restructure and retrench if this is necessary to become even more competitive and 
more profitable. The court held that the appellant could, therefore, dismiss the employees for operational 
requirements under s 189, for rejecting its proposal on changing the terms and conditions of employment.93   
 
In Van Rooyen & others V Blue Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd,94 the court held that a fair procedure demands 
that the parties engage in a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process. The obligation is to consult over 
alternative employment and to take steps to accommodate affected employees in that employment is more onerous 
in circumstances where the rationale for a proposed retrenchment is to improve profitability.95 Although the courts 
are in general in favour of an approach that an employer may dismiss for operational reasons to increase profits it 
does not mean that the employer may do so at will and disregard the fairness test for operational requirements.96 
 
 
                                                     
88 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 314 
89 (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at 1923 E & H 
90 Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others V Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at 1940 E 
91 (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 148 D-E 
92 (2004) 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC) at 2174 E-F  
93 Mazista Tiles v NUM (2004) 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC) at 2174 F  
94 (2010) 31 ILJ 2357 (LC)  at 2741 I 
95 Van Rooyen & others V Blue Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 2357 (LC) at 2744 I-J 
96 Van Rooyen & others V Blue Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 2357 (LC) at 2744-5 J 
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2.5 Technological needs 
 
Item I of the Code refers to “technological reasons” as follows: 
 
“Technological reasons are the introduction of new technology that affects work relationships either by making 
existing jobs redundant or by requiring employees to adapt to the new technology or a consequential restructuring 
of the workplace.” 
 
‘Technological needs’ refers to the introduction of new technology, such as more advanced machinery, mechanism 
or computerisation that leads to the redundancy of employees.97 The technological needs of the employer were 
considered in the following cases:  
 
In Hlongwane & Another v Plastix (Pty) Ltd (Hlongwane),98 the applicant’s job had become redundant as a result 
of the fact that there was no one within the respondent who had the necessary expertise to train the first applicant to 
use a particular engraving machine. The court distinguished between retrenchment and redundancy and held that 
retrenchment occurs when the employer terminates the employees’ employment as they have become in excess due 
to an economic downturn. The employees then lose their jobs but not necessarily permanently.99 Redundancy 
means that an employee becomes redundant as a result of, for instance, the introduction of new machinery or 
technology or the restructuring of the business. In this instance the employment of the employee is lost 
permanently.100  
 
The court further held that this particular matter is a case of redundancy, which places a greater duty on the 
employer to assist the employee than in the case of retrenchment. ‘The reasons, therefore, are as follows: First, it is 
the employer’s own action that caused the redundancy in that he either bought new machinery or restructured the 
business. Secondly, the employer is in control of the situation and need not make hasty decisions. Time is not a 
factor as in the case of retrenchment where a delay would severely prejudice the employer. Thirdly, in the case of 
redundancy, the employee will lose his job permanently.’101 
 
In Singh & Others v Moni Paper,102 the applicants’ positions had become redundant as a result of the introduction 
and implementation of an integrated business information system, SAP. The purpose of this system was to absorb 
the manual work which previously had been carried out by the applicants. Other aspects of their work were 
comfortably absorbed into other functions where there was now spare capacity following the implementation of 
SAP.103 The court held that the decision to retrench the applicants was substantively fair in that it was based on the 
                                                     
97 Basson et al Essential Labour Law (2005) 226 
98 (1990) 11 ILJ 171 (IC) 173 at par E- F 
99 Hlongwane & Another v Plastix (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ 171 (IC) at 175 J-176 A 
100 Hlongwane & Another v Plastix (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ 171 (IC) at 176 A 
101 Hlongwane & Another v Plastix (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ 171 (IC) at 176 B-D 
102 (2000) 21 ILJ 966 (LC) at 970 A 
103 Singh & Others v Moni Paper (2000) 21 ILJ 966 (LC) at 970 C 
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operational requirements of the respondent, but that the selection of the applicants was not affected in accordance 
with a fair procedure.104 
 
In terms of Hlongwane, it would appear that there is, therefore, a greater onus on the employer to assist the 
employee with internal factors such as the introduction of new technology, which is caused by the employer’s own 
actions than with external factors such as a downturn in the economy, which is caused by factors beyond the 
control of the employer. 
 
2.6 Structural needs 
 
Item I of the Code refers to “structural reasons” as follows: 
 
“Structural reasons are the redundancy of posts consequent to a restructuring of the employer’s enterprise.” 
Restructuring can be attributed to internal and external factors such as a financial loss suffered by a business due to 
a weak business model or a downturn in demand for products and are thus economically motivated. In cases of 
internal factors, the restructuring of the business model or structure of the business is normally identified as the sole 
cause of the poor financial performance, hence the need to restructure. 
 
In Van Rooyen and others v Blue Financial Services (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd,105 respondent identified the structure 
of the regional manager position as the sole significant cause of the poor sales performance. The applicants were 
therefore subsequently informed that the efficiency, productivity and relevance of all positions had been considered 
and that the restructuring process was to be commenced with the regional managers.106 The purpose was to 
streamline the existing structure, and to reduce the number of regional manager posts. The applicants, therefore, 
had to undergo assessment, and the outcome of those assessments would determine their eligibility for appointment 
to the new posts.107  
 
The employer disregarded fairness tests for operational requirements in that it had taken a decision to retrench, 
which was unfair to the applicants. The court held that the employer failed to consult on alternatives and, therefore, 
the dismissal was procedurally unfair.108  
 
2.7 Similar needs 
 
Section 213 of the Act defines operational requirements also to mean “similar needs of the employer” which 
constitutes a reason for dismissal provided that the test for fairness has been complied with. 
 
                                                     
104 Singh & Others v Moni Paper (2000) 21 ILJ 966 (LC) at 984 H 
105 (2010) 31 ILJ 2735 (LC) at 2738 A  
106 Van Rooyen and others v Blue Financial Services (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 2735 (LC) at 2738 B-C 
107 Van Rooyen and others v Blue Financial Services (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 2735 (LC) at 2738 D 
108 Van Rooyen and others v Blue Financial Services (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 2735 (LC) at 2745 J 
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In Tiger Food Brands Ltd t/a Albany Bakeries v Levy No & Others,109 the Labour Court noted that the Code 
attempted to define what is meant by the economic, technological and structural needs of the employer but did not 
attempt to define the all-encompassing phrase ‘or similar needs of the employer’. The court viewed a narrow 
interpretation of the definition of operational requirements as inappropriate and held that the phrase ‘or similar 
needs of the employer’ relates to the needs of the employer that have some resemblance of economic, technological 
or structural needs.110 In this case, the applicant feared for the safety of its manager after having received a 
threatening cell phone message.111 The court held that the inability of the employer to manage its business due to a 
threat to the management, affects the economic viability of the enterprise and if the reasons for the proposed 
retrenchment did not fit into the basket of economic reasons, they had a resemblance to economic reasons.112  
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
 
The term ‘similar needs’ is very broad and the Code does not attempt to define the all-encompassing term for the 
‘similar needs of the employer’. It will, therefore, be impossible to provide an exhaustive list of what constitutes 
‘similar reasons for dismissal’. However, in circumstances where the survival or well-being of the business is 
threatened it may be fair to dismiss an employee for a reason related to the ‘similar needs of the employer’ since it 
affects the economic viability of the enterprise.113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
109 (2007) 28 ILJ 1808 (LC) at 1831 F & A 
110 Tiger Food Brands Ltd t/a Albany Bakeries v Levy No & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1808 (LC) at 1824 I 
111 Tiger Food Brands Ltd t/a Albany Bakeries v Levy No & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1808 (LC) at 1831 A-B & D 
112 Tiger Food Brands Ltd t/a Albany Bakeries v Levy No & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1808 (LC) at 1834 F-G & 1836 C  
113 Tiger Food Brands Ltd t/a Albany Bakeries v Levy No & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1808 (LC) at 1834 F-G   
 
 
 
 
  16 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The right to fair labour practices is unambiguously proclaimed and regulated in the LRA 66 of 1995.114 Section 185 
of the LRA specifically protects the right of the employee not to be unfairly dismissed or subjected to unfair labour 
practice.  
 
The concept of fairness (although in the context of a labour discrimination complaint) is described by Willis JA in 
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead115  as follows: “[127] Fairness, particularly, in the context of the LRA, requires 
an evaluation that is multi-dimensional. One must look at it not only from the perspective of prospective employees 
but also employers and the interest of society as a whole. Policy considerations play a role. There may be features 
in the nature of the issue which call for restraint by a court in coming to a conclusion that a particular act of 
discrimination is unfair.” 
 
3.2 SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS 
 
The two requirements for a fair dismissal as laid down in s 188 of the LRA are namely, substantive fairness and 
procedural fairness. It does this by requiring that the reason for a dismissal must be fair and that the dismissal must 
be effected in accordance with a fair procedure.116 
 
In terms of the first requirement, the question whether or not an employer’s dismissal for operational reasons is 
substantively fair is according to the courts a factual one.117 First, the employer must prove that the proffered 
reason for the dismissal is one based on the operational requirements of the business. 118 In other words, he needs to 
prove that the reason for the dismissal was based on economic, technological, structural or similar needs of an 
employer as defined in s 213 of the LRA.  
 
Secondly, the employer has to prove that the operational requirements actually existed; that it was the real reason 
for the dismissal and that the proffered operational reason is not a cover-up for another reason for the dismissal of 
the employees.119 In SA Chemical Workers Union & others v Toiletpak (Pty) Ltd & others,120 where a transfer of 
business by Toiletpak Manufacturers necessitated the dismissal of employees for operational reasons, the Industrial 
Court held that the real reason for the transfer was Toiletpak Manufacturers’ was a stratagem in order to rid itself of 
a number of employees whom it suspected of misconduct. 
 
                                                     
114 Grogan J 11 ed (2014) 188 
115 2000 (3) SA 529 (LAC) at 559 F 
116 Basson et al (2005) 235 
117 Basson et al (2005) 236 
118 Basson et al (2005) 236 
119 Basson et al (2005) 236 
120 (1988) 9 ILJ 295 (IC) at 299 A & E; 305 G & 306 D 
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The requirements for substantive fairness have always been controversial.121 Despite the fact that s 188 of the LRA 
66 of 1995 provides that the employer must establish a fair reason for dismissal, the courts were initially 
disinclined to subject the employer’s rationale for retrenchment to extensive scrutiny.122  
  
A series of Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court cases followed in which different formulations have been 
suggested for the test to be employed when determining the substantive fairness of a dismissal based on the 
employer’s operational requirements such as “a bona fide reason to retrench”, “a commercial rationality to 
retrench”, “a measure of last resort” and “proportionality”. The different formulations assisted in the test for 
substantive fairness to become more established. 
  
The differing views of our courts when considering the substantive fairness of a decision to dismiss employees for 
operational reasons is evident from the case law below:  
 
In National Union of Metalworkers of SA V Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd,123 the court stated that ‘fairness to 
retrench goes further that bona fides and the commercial justification to retrench but that it is concerned, first and 
foremost, with the question whether the termination of the employment is the only reasonable option in the 
circumstances. It has become trite for our courts to state that the termination of employment for disciplinary and 
performance-related reasons should always be a measure of last resort. That, in our view, applies equally to 
termination of employment for economic or operational reasons.’ 
 
In SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union & others v Discreto-A Division of Trump & Springbok Holdings,124  the 
Labour Appeal Court held that the function of the Labour Court is not to second-guess the commercial or business 
efficacy of the employer’s ultimate decision. When determining the rationality of the employer’s decision it is not 
the court’s function to decide whether it was the best decision under the circumstances, but only whether it was a 
rational, commercial or operational decision.  
 
 In BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union,125 the court stated that ‘The word “fair” 
[in section 188] introduces a comparator that is a reason which must be fair to both parties affected by the decision. 
The starting point is whether there is a commercial rationale for the decision. But, rather than take such justification 
at face value, a court is entitled to examine whether the particular decision has been taken in a manner which is also 
fair to the affected party, namely the employees to be retrenched. To this extent the court is entitled to enquire as to 
whether a reasonable basis exists on which the decision, including the proposed manner, to dismiss for operational 
requirements is predicated. Viewed accordingly, the test becomes less deferential and the court is entitled to 
examine the content of the reasons given by the employer, albeit that the enquiry is not directed to whether the 
reason offered is the one which would have been chosen by the court. Fairness, not correctness is the mandated 
test.’  
 
                                                     
121 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 315 
122 Van Niekerk et al (2015) 315 
123 (1993) 14 ILJ 642 (LAC) at 643 B-C 
124 (1998) ILJ 1451 (LAC) at 1455 A-C 
125 (2001) 22 ILJ 2269 (LAC) at 2269 I-2270 A 
 
 
 
 
  18 
 
In Algorax,126 the council for the employees on an appeal submitted that the dismissal of the appellants was 
automatically unfair as contemplated by s 187(1)(c) of the LRA. The dismissal of the appellants in this matter 
followed a refusal by them to accept a proposal made by the respondent to change their straight day shift to a 
rotating shift which entailed also working at night as well as on a Saturday and Sunday. It was submitted on behalf 
of the appellants that the issue of whether the appellants should agree to the rotating shift proposed by the 
respondent was a matter of mutual interest between the employer and the employee as contemplated by s 187(1) 
(c).127  
 
The court held that where an employer seeks to reduce costs in his business and demands that his employees agree 
to work short time, that employer has genuine operational requirements justifying the working of short-time but, 
without the employees consent; he is not entitled to require them to work short-time.128 He may, however, dismiss 
the employees for operational requirements in order to get rid of them permanently and employ a new workforce 
that will be prepared to work in accordance with the needs of his business.129 He, therefore, will be dismissing his 
old workforce as the contracts of employment he has with them no longer properly serve his operational 
requirements. However, the employer could also decide that for certain reasons, such as the employees’ skills and 
experience, he does not want to get rid of his workforce permanently but wishes to retain them and for that reason 
dismisses them not for the purpose of employing others in their positions permanently but to compel them to agree 
to accept his proposals. Such a dismissal the court held is not permitted and consequently automatically unfair as 
was the situation in this case.130  
 
The court further held that it has to determine the fairness of a dismissal objectively when seized with a dispute 
about the fairness of a dismissal. The court must answer the question whether a dismissal was fair or not and not 
defer it to the employer for the purpose of answering that question.131 It, therefore, cannot, for example, say that the 
employer thinks it is fair and, therefore, it is or should be fair.132  
 
The court held that the employer has chosen a solution that result in dismissals of a number of employees when 
there is obviously a clear way in which he could have addressed the problems without any employees losing their 
jobs or with fewer job losses.133 Consequently, the court should therefore not hesitate to deal with the matter on the 
basis that the employer uses a solution which preserves jobs, rather than one which causes job losses, especially a 
so-called no-fault dismissal which is regarded as a death penalty in the field of labour and employment law.134   
 
In the case of Mazista Tiles v NUM,135 the court held that the employees were dismissed for a fair reason based on 
the employer’s operational requirements and consequently such a dismissal was substantively fair. In this case the 
employer considered restructuring its business due to fierce competition in the industry in order to regain the lost 
                                                     
126 (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at para 35 
127 Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at1929 A 
128 Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at 1929 B-C 
129 Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at 1929 E 
130 Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at 1929 I 
131 Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at 1939 G-H 
132 Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at 1939 J 
133 Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at 1939 J 
134 Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at 1940 A-B 
135 (2004) 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC) at para 58 
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market and to remain competitive.136 As part of the restructuring, he proposed a revision of the benefits and 
conditions of employment by terminating both the feeding scheme and hostel accommodation he provided to his 
employees.137  
 
The court held that where a dismissal for operational requirements is directly linked to the employees’ rejection of 
the proposals to changing terms and conditions of service, the continuing existence of the employees’ jobs is 
irrelevant to the determination whether or not there was a fair reason for dismissal as such dismissal would have 
been necessary by virtue of the changing business requirements and not that the jobs themselves were redundant.138 
The employer may, therefore, dismiss employees who reject such proposals and replace them with new employees 
who are prepared to work in accordance with the needs of the business provided that the requirements of s 189 are 
complied with.  
 
In Fry’s Metals,139 the employer suggested ways of increasing productivity. The company had planned to introduce 
certain changes in the workplace which included a change in the shift system allowance to increase productivity 
and enhanced job security.140 The employer then subsequently dismissed the workers that refused to accept the 
intended changes asserting that the dismissals were necessitated by economic health and environmental factors.141 
The Labour Appeal Court found that the dismissals were final and were not meant to compel the employees to 
accept the proposed changes.142  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that s 187(1)(c) only applies to dismissals that are subject to being withdrawn 
by the employer upon the employees’ acceptance of the employer’s demand.143 A dismissal that is final and not 
subject to being withdrawn falls outside the ambit of this section.144 According to the court, a dismissal 
contemplated by s 187(1)(c) is temporary as it is subject to being withdrawn when employees accept the employers 
demand.145  
 
3.3 PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
 
In terms of the second requirement for a fair dismissal, the question whether or not an employer’s dismissal for 
operational reasons is procedurally fair will depend on whether the employer complied with all the requirements 
for a fair procedure as set out in s 189.146 The employer must prove on a balance of probabilities that the procedure 
followed was in accordance with the provisions of s 189.147 The requirements for a procedurally fair dismissal that 
the employer must comply with as set out in s 189, in short, are as follows: 
                                                     
136 Mazista Tiles v NUM (2004) 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC) at para 3 
137 Mazista Tiles v NUM (2004) 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC) at para 10 
138 Mazista Tiles v NUM (2004) 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC) at para 54 
139 (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 137 F  
140 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 137 G & 138 B-C 
141 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 149 F-G  
142 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 152 J  
143 NUMSA & others v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA) at 708 C-D 
144 NUMSA & others v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA) at 708 F 
145 NUMSA & others v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA) at 708 E 
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  20 
 
• The employer must consult with the person(s) whose dismissal is contemplated;148   
• The consultation must be “a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process” in that it must attempt to reach  
consensus on appropriate matters;149 
• The employer must make written disclosure of relevant information, which includes, inter alia, the reasons for 
the proposed dismissals and the alternatives considered before the proposal to dismiss;150  
• The employer must allow the person whose dismissal is contemplated an opportunity to make 
representations;151 
• He must further consider and respond to representations and where denied, reasons must be provided 
therefore;152  
• The employee(s) to be dismissed must be selected according to agreed criteria by the parties;153 and 
• The employer must disclose the severance pay that is proposed.154 
 
Failure by the employer to comply with any one of the above-listed requirements during a retrenchment exercise 
for operational requirements will render such retrenchment exercise procedurally unfair. Once the employer 
contemplates retrenching its employees, it is required under s 189(1) of the Act to initiate a consultative process 
with the employees likely to be affected by the dismissals or their representatives. Section 189(2) of the Act 
envisages the consultative process to be a ‘meaningful’ joint consensus-seeking process which implies that the 
employer should make a genuine attempt to reach consensus on the issues prescribed by s 189(2) and not merely go 
through the motions.155 In Atlantis Diesel Engines,156 the court held that the word ‘contemplate’ ‘simply means that 
an employer, who senses that it might have to retrench employees in order to meet his operational objectives, must 
consult with the employees likely to be affected (or their representatives) at the earliest opportunity in order to 
advise them of the possibility of retrenchment and the reasons for it. 
 
In large scale retrenchments, s 189A of the LRA provides for additional requirements for procedural fairness of 
which the main requirements include the duty by the employer not to retrench employees during a strike and to 
submit to facilitation by the Council for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) or accredited agency 
during the consultation process.157 Either one of the parties can request the CCMA to appoint a facilitator. 
Furthermore, s 189A introduces a moratorium of 60 days during which the employer may not dismiss and which 
starts from the date on which notice was given in terms of section 189(3).158 Section 189A applies to employers 
with more than 50 employees, but at least 10 employees must be earmarked for retrenchment.159 
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The principles of procedural fairness have been laid down by our courts in numerous decisions. Section 189 
requires consulting parties to reach consensus on various matters specified.160 Consultation is therefore not one-
sided.161 In Food and Allied Workers Union & others v SA Breweries,162 SA Breweries anticipated that in its 
pursuit of a World Class Manufacturing (WCM) strategy that such strategy could lead to job losses. It, therefore, 
attempted to negotiate a ‘Workplace Change Agreement’ with the union nationally. When negotiations failed the 
company decided to abandon its continued negotiations with the union and refused a request by the unions to afford 
them a month to study the company’s business plan and formulate a response.163 The company then immediately 
thereafter started a process of restructuring each brewery and set about implementing its proposal before the union 
presented its counter-proposal. It then purported to consult with the union in circumstances where the reversal of 
the situation was virtually impossible.164 The court held that the procedural unfairness of the company in this 
matter was of a serious nature. Not only the model of restructuring but also the entry level for the new job 
specifications had been fixed nationally by the company in a unilateral fashion.165 Also, the selection criteria for 
retrenchment in the collective agreement between the parties were completely ignored by the company.166 
 
Section 189(1) further requires the employer to consult over dismissals with any person whom the employer is 
required to consult in terms of a collective agreement.167 If there is no collective agreement requiring consultation, 
the employer must consult with a workplace forum if the employees likely to be affected by the proposed 
dismissals are employed in a workplace where there is a workplace forum and any trade union whose members are 
likely to be affected by the proposed dismissals.168 If there is no workplace forum, the employer must consult with 
any registered trade union.169 In Aunde South Africa (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal Workers of South 
Africa,170 the employer was engaged in a consultative process for retrenchment of hourly paid workers in terms of s 
189 of the Act with NUMSA. Apart from the retrenchment exercise Aunde SA intended to re-employ the workers 
afresh on minimum level rates of pay and conditions of service prescribed by the bargaining council’s main 
agreement.171 NUMSA opposed this proposal but the other consulting union for the monthly salaried employees, 
UASA, accepted the proposal.172 As NUMSA had ceased to enjoy the majority membership, Aunde SA then 
concluded a recognition agreement with UASA acknowledging UASA as the sole bargaining representative of 
Aunde SA.173 The latter agreement was followed by a signed agreement with UASA which provided that the 
hourly paid employees would be retrenched and re-employed on new terms and conditions.174 When NUMSA 
wanted to continue consulting, it was told by Aunde SA that its membership had dropped to below a majority in the 
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bargaining unit.175  The Labour Court recorded in its judgement that the crisp issue for determination was whether 
the appellant had a duty to consult with the respondent (NUMSA) after it lost its majority membership and after the 
appellant had signed a recognition agreement with UASA.176 The Labour Court concluded in its judgement that 
although Aunde SA and UASA had a recognition agreement this agreement in itself however, did not regulate the 
consultation process in the case of a retrenchment. Therefore, in the absence of a retrenchment procedure in the 
recognition agreement Aunde SA was obliged to consult with NUMSA before the dismissal of its members for 
operational reasons.177 The Labour Court consequently found that the appellant’s failure to consult with the 
respondent rendered the retrenchment of the respondent’s members procedurally unfair.178 The current appeal 
failed as the court found no basis to interfere with the decision of the Labour Court.179 
 
The requirements for procedural fairness regulated in s 189 are also applicable in the case of large-scale 
retrenchments by the employer.180 Consequently, the employer has to comply with the requirements for procedural 
fairness regulated in both s 189 and s 189A in the case of large-scale retrenchments.181 In National Union of 
Mineworkers & others v Revan Civil Engineering Contractors & Others,182 a limited retrenchment has grown into 
a larger retrenchment and the provisions of s 189A had come into operation. This is a matter where three associated 
companies namely Requad, Revan Plant and Revan Civils initially set about retrenching 31 and then a further 39 
employees. The reason for this was that the third respondent (Requad), a company with BEE credentials, had over a 
period of 12 months experienced a ‘drastic reduction’ in the amount of tenders available from the  government and 
the private sector and, therefore, had to scale down its activities. This position of Requad resulted in a knock on 
effect to Revan Plant and Revan Civils whose activities were closely related to that of Requad.183 As a result, both 
Revan Plant and Revan Civils also had to scale down their activities. However, the financial situation of the 
companies worsened to such an extent that a further 39 names had to be added to the initial list of potential 
retrenchees. Each company gave notices of dismissal to their employees and engaged in consultations as envisaged 
by s 189. This course of action was contested by the applicants in the Labour Court whereupon the employers made 
two concessions namely: that s 189A applied to the entire retrenchment exercise and that LIFO (last in, first out) as 
a selection criterion should have been applied across all the companies.184 It was submitted by the union that the 
dismissals were unlawful and invalid in terms of s 189A as it is common cause that no facilitator had been 
appointed and the notices of termination had been given prematurely. The court did not accept the argument of the 
union but nonetheless found some of the dismissals to be procedurally unfair.185 On appeal, the union argued that 
all the retrenchments were invalid for non-compliance with the provisions of s 189A. The employers in return 
argued that the appeal courts did not have “jurisdiction” to hear the matter because of the terms of s 189A(18).186 
Section 189A(18) reads as follows: “The Labour Court may not adjudicate a dispute about the procedural fairness 
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of a dismissal based on the employer’s operational requirements in any dispute referred to it in terms of s 191(5) 
(b)(ii)”. The court held that ‘unless there has been a valid dismissal the court may not intervene on the basis that the 
dismissal was unfair and s 189A(18) is not intended to disturb this principle’.187 The court further held that the 
dismissals were invalid for being in breach of the provisions of s 189A of the LRA.188 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION  
 
Although our Labour Courts have not always been consistent in formulating what test to be employed when 
determining the substantive fairness of a dismissal based on the employer’s operational requirements, it appears 
from the Labour Appeal Court’s decisions in BMD, Algorax and other cases that the approach taken by our courts 
reflect the test of a ‘commercial rationality to retrench’ in our law today. The approach suggests that the court’s 
function is merely to determine whether or not the decision has been correct. As indicated above in National Union 
of Metalworkers of SA V Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd, 189 ‘What is at stake is not the correctness of the decision to 
retrench, but the fairness thereof. Fairness in this context goes further than the bona fides and the commercial 
justification to the decision to retrench. It is concerned first and foremost with the decision whether the termination 
of employment is the only reasonable option in the circumstances.’ 
 
Our courts have recognised an employee’s right to restructure for reasons of profitability and efficiency as opposed 
to reasons which threaten the financial stability of the business. It, therefore, appears to have abandoned the 
element of ‘necessity’ as required in the test for a measure of last resort.  
 
Furthermore, in a market driven economy there can be no objection, in principle, to retrenching employees to 
increase profit margins which are, in fact, a duty owed to shareholders. Such retrenchment must, however, comply 
with a fair reason for retrenchment and must be effected in accordance with a fair procedure as required by s 188 of 
the Act. 
 
Du Toit correctly summarises the position arrived at by our courts as follows: 
(a)  “To be valid, a dismissal for operational reasons must be (i) based on an ‘operational requirement’ as defined 
in s 213 of the LRA and, within this framework, (ii) for a fair reason. 
(b) A fair reason for dismissal is not limited to efforts to save a business but may be related to any legitimate 
business objective, including bona fide attempts at improving its efficiency, profitability or competitiveness. 
(c)  However, not every reason related to a legitimate business objective will be fair. Dismissal will only be 
substantively fair if it represents ‘a measure of last resort’, or is necessary’, to achieve the objective in 
question. The employer must show, in other words, that in pursuing that objective ‘all viable alternative steps 
have been considered and taken to prevent the retrenchments or to limit these to a minimum”.190   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The International Labour Conference (ILO) adopted the first instrument specifically dealing with termination of 
employment in the form of a Recommendation in 1963 (No 119).191 The requirement of consultation originates 
from the aforementioned Recommendation. 
 
The Termination of Employment Convention (No 158) was subsequently adopted to supplement Recommendation 
119.192 The guidelines in Convention 158 has been observed in judgements delivered by the judiciary and industrial 
courts of member states that ratified the convention as well as those states that did not do so.193  In South Africa 
(SA), Australia and United Kingdom (UK), the courts have sought to refer to the Convention’s legal reasoning as a 
point of reference as well as on the grounds that it enshrines principles of good industrial relations practice.194  
 
Article 13(1)(b) of the Convention, in particular, requires that an employer contemplating termination for reasons 
of an economic, technical, structural or similar nature hold consultations with the worker’s representatives as early 
as possible, on measures to mitigate the adverse effects of any terminations on the workers concerned, such as 
finding alternative employment. Article 13(1)(a) further requires that the representatives concerned  must be 
provided in good time with relevant information, including reasons for terminations, the number and categories of 
workers likely affected and the period over which the terminations are intended to be carried out. 
 
4.2 THE OBLIGATION TO CONSULT REGARDING DISMISSALS BASED ON OPERATIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS: EVALUATING SOUTH AFRICA TO THAT OF FOREIGN 
JURISDICTIONS  
 
The obligation to consult, in regard to operational requirement dismissals, in SA is comprehensively regulated by s 
189 and s 189A of the LRA.195 Section 189 of the LRA was discussed on page 3 and 4 above. 
 
Section 189(1) requires that the consultation process commences when the employer contemplates dismissing one 
or more employees based on operational requirements and not when the decision to dismiss has already been 
determined. In 4Seas Worldwide (Pty) Ltd v the Commission for Conciliation Mediation & Arbitration and 
Others, 196 Coppin AJA confirmed that in a retrenchment dispute the employer bears the onus to prove that a fair 
process was followed before dismissing the respondent. This would include proving that the redundancy of the 
employment and the termination of her contract was not a fait accompli and that the alleged process followed was 
not a sham. In Super Group Trading (Pty) Ltd v Janse van Rensburg,197  Landman AJA stated the following: 
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 “If the decision to make a post redundant is set in stone and not open to revision or discussion then the aim of the 
consultation has been thwarted before it has begun. If the decision to retrench a certain person has been pre-
decided, consultation about whether this person should be chosen is a sham. What remains is consultation on the 
mitigation of retrenchment.” 
 
4.3 THE UNITED KINGDOM  
 
4.3.1 Background 
 
The UK is considered as the country that had the most significant influence on developing the SA society and its 
legal framework.198 South Africa was for many years a British colony and, even though, SA has other official 
languages, English is regarded as the medium language generally used in business and the courts.199 The UK is 
regarded as SA’s second-largest trading partner in the European Union and many traditions in the SA legal systems 
stem from the UK.200 
 
4.3.2 The Law 
 
In the UK, the duty to consult, in regard to operational requirement redundancies, are regulated by s188 of the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA). The most relevant parts of s188 for the 
purposes of this evaluation are the following: 
 
• When an employer proposes to dismiss as redundant 20 or more employees within a period of 90 days or less, 
the employer is required to consult with the trade union representative of the employee(s) who may be 
affected by the proposed dismissals or the measures taken in connection with the proposed dismissals.201 
 
• The consultation shall be undertaken by the employer who must attempt to reach consensus with the 
representatives, which shall include measures of avoiding the dismissals; reducing the numbers of employers 
to be dismissed; and mitigating the consequences of the dismissal.202 
 
• The consultation process is initiated by s 188(4) which requires the employer to disclose in writing to the 
trade union representatives the reasons for his proposals; the numbers and descriptions of employees whom it 
proposes to dismiss as redundant; the total number of employees of any such description employed by the 
employer at the establishment in question ; the proposed method of selecting the employees to be dismissed; 
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and the proposed method of carrying out the dismissals, with due regard to any agreed procedure, including 
the period over which the dismissals are to take effect.203 
 
• The employer must in the course of the consultation process consider any representations made by the trade 
union representatives, and reply to those representations and, if he rejects any of those representations, state 
his reasons, therefor. 
 
• Where there are special circumstances which render compliance not reasonably practicable, the employer 
shall take steps towards compliance as are reasonably practicable.204  
 
In UK Coal Mining Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers,205 UK Coal informed the employee representatives that 
the mine would be closing and that the reason for the proposed redundancies was special circumstances as a result 
of being forced to cease production for safety reasons. The tribunal held that there was no obligation to consult 
about the reason for the closure, but as UK Coal chose to give information about the reason for closure that 
information should have been true and given in good faith.206 Furthermore, the tribunal found that there was no 
credible evidence that the reason for the dismissals was safety and the misleading evidence consequently involved 
a breach of s 188(4)(a).207 On appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) held that UK Coal had failed to 
comply with the duty to consult by giving a deliberately misleading reason for the closure, which affected the 
nature of the consultation.208 The court had to decide whether the limitation in the word “proposed” when 
contrasted with the word “contemplated” prevents the consultation obligation extending to consultations over 
closures leading to redundancies. It subsequently held that it does not prevent the consultation.209 The court further 
held that the difference between proposed and contemplated will impact on the point in time at which the duty to 
consult arises. In the case of the word “proposed” it will not be when the closure is mooted as a possibility but only 
when it is fixed as a clear intention.210 The court further held that it is the proposed dismissals that are the subject 
of consultation, and not the closure itself. Therefore, if an employer planned a closure but believed that 
redundancies would nonetheless be avoided, there would be no need to consult over the closure itself.211 
Furthermore, the court held that the true reason for the dismissal was the economic difficulties facing the 
employers.212 
 
The approaches in the UK and SA are fairly similar, in terms of reaching consensus on certain items, the initiation 
of the consultation process and representation made to representatives. The similarities in the consultation 
processes in SA and the UK is perhaps due to the profound influence the English law had on our legal system. 
However, there are differences of which the following are noticeable. First, as indicated in chapter one, the words 
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“contemplates” in s 189(1) of the LRA envisages an earlier state in time than the words “proposing” under S 188(1) 
of the UK Act and will impact on the point in time at which the duty to consult arises.213 The word “proposing” in s 
188(1) is regarded as less compatible as it envisages consultation only after a proposal has been made whereas the 
word “contemplates” in s 189 of the LRA envisages an earlier state in time.214  
 
Secondly, s 188 imposes a bar on the consultation process in that it requires consultation only in the situation where 
the employer is proposing to dismiss as redundant 20 or more employees.215 It is therefore safe to say that in a 
situation where the employer proposes a redundancy of fewer than 20 employees those employees will be targeted 
by the aforementioned exclusion. In comparison, s 189(1) of the LRA provides that the employer must consult 
when he contemplates dismissing one or more employees for reasons based on operational requirements.  
 
Thirdly, the requirement in s 189(2) of the LRA that the consulting parties to engage in a ‘meaningful joint 
consensus-seeking process’ and attempt to reach consensus, implies that the consulting parties must do more to 
reach consensus than in a normal consultation process in the case of the UK which merely provides in s 188(2) that 
the employer must attempt to reach consensus.216 As a result of the aforementioned, it is submitted that the 
consultation criteria regarding a ‘meaningful joint consensus-seeking process ‘ in SA is more extensive in respect 
of the consultation processes regarding dismissals based on operational requirements than in the UK and, therefore, 
makes it more challenging for employers to dismiss employees. 
 
4.4 AUSTRALIA 
 
4.4.1  Background 
 
In Australia, there are three time periods governed by different but related legislative provisions and which 
coincides with the changes government can be distinguished by, namely: the Workplace Relations Act 1996, the 
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 and the current Fair Work Act 2009 (FWA).217  
 
Under the Work Choices Act the protection from large sectors of the eligible workforce was removed by the 
introduction of the 100 employee exemption which led to the loss of many jobs by businesses which had reduced 
their workforce due to the new laws.218 Furthermore, the Work Choice Amendments introduced a “genuine 
operational reasons” exclusion that barred a claim of unfair dismissal where reasons of an economic, technical, 
structural or similar nature were claimed.219  
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In the lead up to the 2007 election, the Rudd Labour Government gave priority to ripping up Work Choices and 
providing ‘cooperative workplace relations’ that balanced ‘flexibility’ to employers and ‘fairness’ to employees.220 
It restored the balance by abolishing the 100 employee exemption and replacing the “genuine operational reasons” 
with the ‘redundancy exemption’.221 Whilst still in the infancy stage, the FWA was met with tacit approval by both 
employer and worker groups.222 The FWA is the product of extensive consultation with businesses, the union 
movement and the wider community and deliberated drafting, thus providing an opportunity for a ‘period of 
stability’ in Australia’s industrial development.223  
  
4.4.2  The Law 
 
The FWA makes provision for a model consultation term to apply if the parties to the enterprise agreement did not 
include their own consultation term. The model consultation term is then taken to be the term of the agreement.224 
The most relevant parts of the model consultation term as contained in regulation 2.09 of the Fair Work 
Regulations (FWR) are as follows: 
 
• Where the  employer has made a definite decision to introduce major changes in production, programme, 
organisation, structure or technology in relation to its enterprise that is likely to have a significant effect on 
the employees he must notify the employees of the change.225  
  
• Significant effects include termination of employment; major changes in composition; operation or size of the 
employer's workforce or to the skills required of employees; or the elimination or diminution of job 
opportunities (including opportunities for promotion or tenure); or the alteration of hours of work; or the need 
to retrain employees; or the need to relocate employees to another workplace; or the restructuring of jobs.226 
 
• The employer must discuss, as soon as practicable after making its decision, with the employees the 
introduction of the change;  the effect the change is likely to have on the employees; measures the employer is 
taking to avert or mitigate the adverse effect of the change on the employees; and for the purposes of the 
discussion provide, in writing, to the relevant employees all relevant information about the change including 
the nature of the change proposed and information about the expected effects of the change on the 
employees.227 
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Part 3-6 Division 2 of the FWA imposes a requirement on an employer who proposes to terminate the employment 
of 15 or more employees for reasons of an ‘economic, technological, structural or similar nature’ to provide written 
notice of the proposed dismissals to the Chief Executive Officer of the Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency 
(Centrelink).228  The employer is also required to provide trade unions with a notice of the proposed terminations 
and reasons for them; the number of employees likely to be affected; the period over which the employer intends to 
carry out the dismissals and an opportunity to consult on measures to avert or minimise proposed dismissals and to 
mitigate the adverse effects of the proposed dismissals.229   
 
Furthermore, s 389 of the FWA 2009 provides as follows: 
 
• A dismissal will be a case of genuine redundancy where the employer no longer requires the person’s job to 
be performed by anyone because of changes in the operational requirements of the employer’s enterprise;230 
and the employer has complied with any modern award or enterprise agreement that applied to the 
employment to consult about the redundancy;231 and  
 
• A person’s dismissal will not be a case of genuine redundancy where it would have been reasonable in all the 
circumstances for the person to be redeployed within the employer’s enterprise;232 or the enterprise of an 
associated entity of the employer.233 
 
In terms of the aforementioned section, employees whose jobs have been made redundant because their job is no 
longer required can now further argue that the process was unfair either because the employer had not complied 
with an obligation to consult as contained in the applicable modern award or enterprise agreement or because they 
could have been reasonably redeployed.234 
 
In Ventyx Pty Ltd v Mr Paul Murray,235 Mr Murray was dismissed on the grounds of redundancy. His dismissal 
was rejected by the Deputy President as a case of genuine redundancy.236 The Deputy President made a series of 
findings on jurisdiction issues, one of which she held that Ventyx was not absolved of its obligation to discuss the 
proposed changes with employees who were covered by the award (that applied to Mr Murray’s employment).237 
She did not accept the submissions made by Ventyx that it was only practicable to discuss the decision of 
redundancy once the individual had been identified and security issues could be addressed. The award provided 
that the discussions must commence as early as practicable after a definite decision has been made by the 
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employer.238 The Deputy President found that there was no opportunity for Mr Murray to change the decision made 
by Ventyx to either downsize the consultancy business or to make him redundant.239  
 
Furthermore, the Deputy President held that the requirement to discuss the change with the affected employees was 
not a discussion as such but an announcement of Ventyx’s intention to make the change. She further found that 
Ventyx failed to give prompt consideration to matters raised by the employees in relation to the changes.240 Lastly, 
she concluded that it would have been reasonable for Ventyx to redeploy Mr Murray in its enterprise or an 
associated entity.241  
 
On appeal the court, however, held that the award provision is intended to apply to security concerns and the need 
to manage a global review process as faced by Ventyx. Therefore, without having evidence-based reasons to reject 
Ventyx explanation as to why it preceded in the manner it did, the Deputy President fell into error.242 It held that 
the Deputy President fell into error when she reformulated the obligation under the award to mean the employer 
was obliged to give an employee an opportunity to change its decision.243 Furthermore, it held that in the absence 
of a properly evidenced finding that there was a position to which Mr Murray could have been re-deployed, that the 
Deputy President was not jurisdictionally positioned to determine whether it would have been reasonable in all the 
circumstances to redeploy Mr Murray.244 The court held, however, that the Deputy President was correct in 
concluding that Ventyx failed to give prompt consideration to matters raised by the employees and/or their 
representatives in relation to the changes.245 
 
Failure to consult is merely one of the factors the court takes into consideration in deciding whether the 
consultation processes are complied with. Failure to provide information requested by an employee is also a factor 
the court has to take into consideration. In Australian Licenced Aircraft Association v Qantas Airways Limited246, 
Qantas contravened the terms of the Fair Work Act following the introduction by Qantas of a new system for the 
maintenance of aircraft known as Maintenance on Demand. This contravention relates to Qantas’ failure to consult 
with the applicant and failing to provide the applicant with information concerning details of leave. Shortly before 
the first contravention occurred, Qantas had determined upon the introduction of Maintenance on Demand that 
thirty positions would be made redundant. The court held that despite the ambiguities in communications between 
Qantas and the applicant that the redundancies were a foregone conclusion, regardless of the consultation process 
that would occur.247 The court further held that even though the Australian Aircraft Engineers Association 
approached the consultations in a negative manner, that Qantas had breached the workplace determination to 
genuinely consult with the applicant in regard to the decision to make thirty positions redundant.248  
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The aforementioned information regarding the leave was required by the union to assist it in the consultation 
process. The court held the relevant information which should have been provided was not provided; hence there 
was a breach of the workplace determination (clause 47.2.3).249 The court subsequently ordered Qantas to pay 
$41,250 in penalties for breaching its consultation obligations and for failing to provide information required for 
effective consultation.250 
When evaluating the consultation requirements in SA with that of Australia, the following differences mentioned 
below are relevant: 
 
In Australia, the obligation to consult and to redeploy in terms of s 389 is a key part of the definition of a genuine 
redundancy under the FWA.251 The obligation to consult in regard to the selection process of the employees to be 
dismissed (for the purpose of procedural fairness) is, however, not part of the redundancy process in Australia.252 
According to Stern, this was a deliberate decision on the part of the Rudd Government rather than an oversight and 
is evident in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008.253 Stern further indicates that “there is 
nothing meaningful in establishing a balanced ‘flexibility’ to employers and ‘ fairness’ to employees that continues 
the former Work Choices Act of absolving employees from the need to conduct a fair selection process”.254 In 
comparison to Australia, both SA and the UK require that the parties consult about the selection criteria and that 
the parties agree to the criteria.255 Section 189(7)(b) of the LRA further provides that if the selection criteria have 
not been agreed upon, then the criteria that are fair and objective should be selected. 
 
In addition, the employer and the other consulting parties are further required to engage in a ‘meaningful joint 
consensus-seeking process’ and attempt to reach consensus.256 This implies that they must do more to reach 
consensus than in a normal consultation process.257 In comparison, in terms of s 389(1)(2) of the FWA, the position 
in Australia is that the employer is to consult about the redundancy. The consultation criteria regarding a 
‘meaningful joint consensus-seeking process ‘in SA is thus more extensive in respect of dismissals based on 
operational requirements than in Australia in that both the consultation parties are required to engage meaningfully 
in the consultation process to reach consensus. As a result hereof, it will be more challenging for employers to 
dismiss employees in SA than in Australia. 
 
Furthermore, as indicated in chapter one, in Australia consultation only takes place where the employer has made a 
‘definite decision’ to introduce major changes which include operational requirement redundancies.258 In SA 
consultation takes place when the employer ‘contemplates’ dismissing employers based on operational 
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requirements. The words ‘definite decision’ is less compatible than the word ‘contemplates’ in that the obligation 
to consult must be fixed, whereas in the case of the word ‘contemplates’ consultation takes place when it is 
envisaged as a possibility.  
 
A ‘definite decision’ to introduce a change consisting of a termination of employment does not require an employer 
to provide an opportunity for the employee to change (or avoid) the definite decision it has made.259 Instead, it 
requires the employer only to discuss certain prescribed matters such as those relating to the introduction and likely 
effects of the change itself.260 In addition, a definite decision to introduce a change consisting of a termination of 
employment before consultation was to commence would in a sense amount to a “fait accompli” as the consultation 
is approached with a fixed outcome in mind.261 In comparison, the situation in SA is different in that the 
consultation includes means of avoiding or minimising dismissals.262  
 
In light of the aforementioned, it is submitted that the consultation requirements relating to operational requirement 
dismissals in SA are more extensive than that of the UK and Australia in that it not only provides for a joint 
consensus seeking consultation but are more geared towards a process of a fair dismissal for the employee.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
A comparative analysis of the obligation to consult, relating to operational requirement dismissals, in SA with that 
of Australia and the UK, reveals that the consultation requirements in SA are more extensive than in Australia and 
the UK. 
 
Under SA law, it is necessary for the consulting parties to engage in a ‘meaningful joint consensus-seeking 
process’ and attempt to reach consensus, which implies that the consulting parties must do more to reach consensus 
than in a normal consultation process in the case of the UK and Australia which merely provides that the employer 
must attempt to reach consensus and to consult about the redundancy respectively. 
 
Furthermore, in SA the obligation to consult when ‘dismissals are contemplated’ envisages an earlier state in time 
than ‘proposing to dismiss’ and a ‘definite decision to dismiss’ as in the case of the UK and Australian 
respectively. This is in line with Article 13(1)(b) of the Convention, which requires that an employer contemplating 
termination for reasons of an economic, technical, structural or similar nature for consultations to be held with the 
worker’s representatives as early as possible.  
 
Compared to SA, Australian and UK law on consultation requirements appears to be less compatible for the 
following reasons: In the UK consultation is only required where the employer is proposing to dismiss as redundant 
20 or more employees, whereas in SA consultation is required where one or more employees are contemplated for 
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dismissal. Furthermore, in Australia there is no obligation to consult on the selection criteria for dismissals of 
employees as in the case of SA. 
 
As a result of the aforementioned, it is submitted that it will be more challenging for employers in SA to prove that 
a dismissal is potentially fair than in the case of Australia and the UK.  
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Once dismissal has been established by the employee, in terms of s 192(1) of the LRA, the employer must prove 
that the dismissal is fair.263 In County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v OCGAWU & another,264 the court ruled as follows:  
 
“If the employer relies on operational requirements to show the existence of a fair reason to dismiss, he must show 
that the dismissal of the employee could not be avoided. That is why both the employer and the employee or his 
representatives are required by s 189 of the Act to explore the possibilities of avoiding the employee’s dismissal.” 
This ruling was further reinforced by the decision in Algorax,265 where the court held that it should intervene where 
it is clear that certain measures could have been taken to avoid or minimise job losses or where it is clear that the 
dismissals were not resorted to as a measure of last resort. 
 
According to Grogan, the dividing line between dismissals effected for permissible reasons and automatically 
unfair dismissals may sometimes blur.266 In the case of an automatically unfair dismissal the employer will have to 
prove that the reason for the dismissal did not fall within the scope of s 187(1)(c).267 Grogan indicates that an 
employer can never raise an acceptable defence in the case of a s 187(1)(c) dismissal other than those set in the 
Act.268  
 
5.2 DISMISSALS BASED ON THE EMPLOYER’S OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND S 187 
(1)(C) OF THE LRA 
 
In Fry’s Metals,269 the court rejected the view that matters of mutual interest must be resolved by a bargaining 
process where dismissals are contemplated due to operational requirements.270 The court concluded that there is a 
difference between a dismissal which is defined in s 186(1) and a dismissal which is contemplated by s 
187(1)(c).271 According to the court, the difference relates to whether the dismissal is effected in order to compel 
the employees to agree to the employer’s demand which would result in the dismissal being withdrawn or whether 
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it is effected finally so that the employer may replace the employees permanently with employees who are prepared 
to work under the terms and conditions of the employer.272 The court reasoned that, in the case of a s 187(1)(c) 
dismissal, the dismissal is conditional and even reversible if the employee accepts the employer’s demand.273 It 
further reasoned that as such a s 187(1)(c) dismissal is not a final dismissal [as in the case of the meaning of a 
dismissal under s186(1)].274 Similarly, in Algorax275 the court endorsed the interpretation adopted in the Fry’s 
Metals (Labour Appeal Court) case that s 187(1)(c) relates to a dismissal that is not final but conditional in nature.  
 
The point to consider above is what the intention of the legislator in relation to the content of s 187(1)(c) was,  and 
whether the legislator intended for a dismissal under s 187(1)(c) to constitute a conditional dismissal subject to 
withdrawal once the employer’s demand was complied with.  
 
Grogan  points out that the ‘ironical result of the aforementioned judgements was that the employer perpetrated an 
automatically unfair dismissal by offering to reinstate or re-employ workers who refuse to accept a demand, but did 
not do so by simply dismissing workers for the same reason’.276 In addition, he indicated that that it ‘seems 
somewhat strange that the legislature should have categorised conditional dismissals in the context of collective 
bargaining as automatically unfair, but excluded final dismissals occurring in the same context .... The final 
dismissal is the fulfilment of the threat that provides the compulsion inherent in the conditional dismissal’.277  
 
According to Cohen, ‘this anomaly could have been avoided if the Labour Appeal Court had adopted a purposive 
interpretation’ in accordance with s 3 of the LRA, which provides that the provisions of the Act are to be 
interpreted to give effect to its primary objects; in compliance with the constitution and in compliance with the 
public international law of the Republic.278 Furthermore, Cohen indicates that no conflict between s 187(1)(c) and s 
189 need arise, provided that the employer is able to prove on the facts that the purpose of the proposed changes 
and the resultant dismissals is motivated by operational requirements and not an ulterior motive.279  
 
Section 187(1)(c)  of  the LRA 66 of 1995 has now been amended by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 
2014 to render it automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is a refusal by employees to accept a demand in 
respect of any matter of mutual interest between them and their employer. A literal interpretation of the 
aforementioned amendment means that a dismissal will be automatically unfair if the employees refuse to accept a 
proposed amendment to the terms and conditions of their employment. Employers are therefore restricted to change 
the terms of conditions of employment without the consent of the employees. The dismissal is automatically unfair, 
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simply, because the employer has made a demand which the employees have refused to accept irrespective whether 
the dismissal or threat of dismissal was intended to induce the employees to comply with the demand.280  
 
According to Grogan, the amendment was aimed at correcting the unexpected manner in which the courts 
interpreted the initial version of s 187(1)(c).281 This perhaps raises the question whether or not the Fry’s Metals 
Supreme Court of Appeal decision has undermined the effect of the bargaining process where an interest dispute 
arises.  
 
Furthermore, the LRA sets out several primary objects to promote collective bargaining: In terms of s 1(c) of the 
LRA, the primary object is to provide a framework within which the employees and the employers can collectively 
bargain to determine terms and conditions of employment and other matters of mutual interest. Furthermore, s 1(d) 
of the LRA provides for the promotion of orderly collective bargaining as well as collective bargaining at sectoral 
level.  
  
However, should the bargaining  process be followed and the parties fail to reach consensus, a delay in 
implementing the proposed changes to the terms and conditions of employment of the business could  result in the 
business not operating effectively or even a collapse of the business. A lock-out will therefore not assist under the 
circumstances. 
 
Van Niekerk and others (Van Niekerk) argues the amendment has the effect of precluding employers from using 
dismissal as an economic weapon.282 According to Van Niekerk, the employer cannot simply in the course of a 
dispute resort to a dismissal, only because the employees refuse to accede to his demands.283  
 
Van Niekerk further states that the employer is not precluded from dismissing his employees for a reason related to 
its operational requirements if the true intention is to replace the employees with those who are willing to work 
according to the new changes.284 The real reason for the dismissal is therefore not the employees’ refusal to accept 
the employers’ demand but is motivated by the economic need of the employer.285 Furthermore, Van Niekerk 
alleges that the line between a s 187(1)(c) dismissal and an operational requirement dismissal will always be a fine 
one and it’s up to the courts to determine where it should be drawn.286 
 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the aforementioned, it is submitted that the possible solutions to interpreting s 187(1)(c) of the Labour 
Relations Amendment Act are as follows: 
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It is suggested that where the employer wishes to introduce a change in respect of any matter of mutual interest in 
the workplace and the employees refuse to accede to his demands, that the parties try and reconcile the matter 
through collective bargaining in the case of a dispute. The employer will then have recourse to consider a lock-out 
where collective bargaining had failed. It would not be fair to simply dismiss the employees because they refuse to 
accede to his demands. This is in line with s 1(c) of the LRA, which primary object is to provide a framework 
within which employees and employers can collectively bargain to determine terms and conditions of employment 
and other matters of mutual interest.  
Where there is an immediate danger that the business will collapse if changes to terms and conditions of 
employment are not implemented, following a failed bargaining process, the employer will be justified in 
retrenching its employees based on the operational requirements of the business. The proviso is that the employer is 
able to prove on the facts that the purpose of the proposed changes and the resultant dismissals is motivated by 
operational requirements and not an ulterior motive.287 The employer is therefore dismissing the employees, not 
because they refused to accept a demand, but because of the economic needs of the employer.288 
 
In circumstances where the changes to the terms and conditions of employment involve an economic dispute in that  
the business is making a profit and the employer want to increase its profit margin it is submitted that the economic 
dispute is resolved through  collective bargaining, failing  which could follow the route of strikes and even lock-
outs.  
 
 It is further submitted that s 187(1)(c) does not prevent employers from dismissing employees who refuse to 
accept a demand if the effect of that dismissal is to save other workers from retrenchment.289  
 
Lastly, it would appear to be a safer approach for the employer, who wishes to change the terms and conditions of 
his employees in circumstances where the viability of the business is threatened, to treat the matter as a 
retrenchment exercise from the start and replace the workers permanently with those who are prepared to work 
under the terms and conditions to meet the employer’s requirements.290 
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